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KOSOVO’S FIFTH ANNIVERSARY 
  
Executive Summary 
Five years: 24 March 2004 marks the fifth anniversary 
of NATO operation Allied Force. As recent bouts of 
violence have tragically demonstrated, stability is still 
fragile, ethnic hatred unabated and rapprochement or 
reconciliation between local Albanians and Serbs as 
illusive as five years ago. 
The status question: As the “standards before status” 
approach has confirmed, conditionalities, incentives 
and international pressure will only go so far in turning 
a weak state-like entity in a functioning state. 
Functional statehood hardly figures in the Belgrade and 
Prishtina visions of the future of Kosovo. All 
indications are that resolving the status issue either way 
– autonomy under Serbian sovereignty or full 
independence – would not provide real answers to the 
many fundamental challenges Kosovo faces, e.g. 
economic restructuring, societal reconciliation and 
European integration. The fundamental flaw of 
“standards before status” is that it can unfold its 
incentive function for one party only and only if it 
prejudices the final status outcome. The opening of a 
negotiation process more readily invokes the forces of 
the past than peaceable visionaries. 
Time: Since 1999, the de facto moratorium on the 
status issue has contributed substantially to 
stabilisation and normalisation in the region, but the 
productive phase of temporising is coming to an end. If 
the logic of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro 
was at least partly linked to Kosovo, the likely 
dissolution of the State Union by early 2006 sets a firm 
time limit for the status of Kosovo. Political 
expediency and timetables are strongly against a 
further postponement of final-status negotiations, even 
though the non-status dialogue will not have shifted 
either partisan position on the status issue one inch. 
Negotiations: In order to earth the extremely 
emotional and zero-sum debates in political reality, it 
would be advisable to challenge both parties to produce 
a concrete platform for future status - much along the 
lines of the initial negotiations between Belgrade and 
Podgorica. The political leaders in Belgrade actually 
have no master plan for a sustainable and domestically 
acceptable solution for Kosovo. Nor do their 
interlocutors from Prishtina have a concept for the Serb 
minority in the envisaged independent Kosovo. The 
endogenous capabilities in Belgrade and Prishtina to 
initiate a constructive process aimed at a mutually 
acceptable compromise arrangement for the final status 
of Kosovo are strictly limited. 
International community: Assuming that the status 
process were to result in acceptance of either 
conditional independence or autonomy within Serbia 
by the negotiating parties, then it would be up to the 
international community to apply the fundamental 
principles of functional statehood, finality of state 
disintegration and fair arrangements for minorities. 
Most likely, at the end of the day, however, the UN and 
the Contact Group will have to define a final status 
single-handedly.  
Triple deadlock: Ideally, the issues of Belgrade’s 
sovereignty over Kosovo and Prishtina’s sovereign 
statehood should be separated. Currently, a triple 
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deadlock exists. The international deadlock concerns 
the threat of a veto in the UNSC against national 
determination leading to secession and independence. 
The bilateral deadlock is Prishtina’s and Belgrade’s 
incapability and unwillingness to compromise on the 
status issue with no perspective whatsoever for the 
international community to sway leaders on either side. 
The local deadlock concerns the standoff between 
Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo.  
Final status: As the bilateral deadlock cannot be 
broken, the international deadlock is the key. The fake 
option or lever of a restoration of Belgrade’s 
sovereignty over Kosovo should be scrapped. The 
Contact Group ought to prepare the ground for new 
UN resolution annulling Res. 1244 and thereby ending 
Belgrade’s sovereignty over Kosovo and transferring 
full sovereignty – not to Prishtina, but to the UN in 
New York. A UN trusteeship would eliminate the 
bilateral deadlock in status negotiations and create 
much better prospects for non-status negotiations. 
Similarly, once the Kosovo Serbs are in a situation 
similar to other Serb minorities (without parallel 
institutions or overriding loyalty to Belgrade), they will 
have to engage with Prishtina and might negotiate 
some for of autonomy within Kosovo. Thus, such a UN 
trusteeship in Europe would be a demanding strategy 
for the international community and the UN in 
particular, but it might produce a functioning state; it 
would be final by not creating a precedent for further 
state disintegration; and it would allow for fair 
arrangements with the Serb minority without upturning 
functionality or finality.  
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Kosovo Today 
Five years have passed since NATO launched its first 
ever military operation in Europe to “prevent atrocities 
and genocide” in Kosovo. The Bosnian debacle had 
certainly fostered the international community’s 
resolve for robust military and diplomatic intervention. 
Dayton also provided UNMIK and KFOR with lessons 
learned for the challenges of modern post-conflict 
management, reaching far beyond mere peace keeping. 
In the case of Kosovo, the unresolved status issue 
exacerbated the challenges of outside state and nation 
building. Kosovo being the lynchpin of regional 
stability, in the aftermath of the war, a quick decision 
on independent statehood was considered a dangerous 
precedent for the “powder keg” of Europe. 
Under international law, Kosovo has remained part of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, now Serbia-and-
Montenegro, although its inner-Yugoslav status as 
autonomous province of Serbia is disputed. UNMIK 
and Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government (PISG) jointly exercise all sovereign 
prerogatives in Kosovo. The international community 
has provisionally taken over from the Belgrade 
authorities in ruling and administrating Kosovo. Most 
Albanian refugees returned right after Milosevic’s 
capitulation in June 1999. Serbs who had fled after the 
war have only trickled back in small numbers despite 
substantial international programs for returnees. Today, 
Serbs constitute a locally concentrated minority of 
about 7% in Kosovo, the Albanians an 88% majority.  
Socio-economic development in the structurally weak 
region of Kosovo has fallen far short of local and 
international expectations. In terms of housing and 
infrastructure the repair of war damages has been 
completed meanwhile, revealing underlying structures 
and macro-economic trends that offer little ground for 
optimism: a continuous slowdown in economic growth; 
a corresponding increase in unemployment; and a huge 
disproportion between import and export. What 
remains is a region with no major assets for sustainable 
economic development, but crippling historical 
legacies and structural deficits. The reform process of 
belated transition is seriously hampered by the local 
ethnic standoff between Albanians and Serbs as well as 
by the political standoff between UNMIK, the 
Belgrade authorities and the Kosovar leadership.  
Human security improved significantly for the ethnic 
and religious minorities in Kosovo as soon as KFOR 
moved in to restore order after all state institutions had 
broken down at the height of the conflict. Interethnic 
violence became incidental, but revived long-
established traditions of Serb-Albanian enmity and the 
frequency of brutal incidents have effectively 
disallowed a return to “normalcy.” The decent 
outbursts of violence have demonstrated how 
dangerously thin the cover of coexistence and how 
explosive the underlying hatreds are. The Serbs 
continue to live in scattered, isolated enclaves - some 
under permanent KFOR protection, but lacking the 
minimal preconditions for normal life. Consequently, 
the results of the increased international efforts to 
restore a “multiethnic Kosovo” by facilitating the 
return of Serb refugees and internally displaced 
persons (IDP) have been meagre, despite the 
abominable circumstances in refugee camps in Serbia 
proper. The number of potential returnees (230-
240,000) canvassed by Belgrade is certainly way off 
the mark, but the number of actual returns (9,000 by 
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early 2004) is too low to be of any significance for the 
process. 
The domestic political process in Kosovo has been 
institutionalised in the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government. “State building” (i.e. institution building) 
intentionally preceded democratisation. Heeding a key 
lesson from Bosnia, the international community opted 
for a bottom-up approach of democratisation, moving 
from local (28 Oct. 2000) to central elections (19 Nov. 
2001). The Constitutional Framework for Provisional 
Self-Government (see p. 16), signed by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General of the United 
Nations (SRSG) Hans Haekkerup on 14 May 2001, 
prepared the ground for “establishing and overseeing 
the development of provisional, democratic self-
government institutions”, as stipulated by Res. 1244 
(see p. 13). Rather than to prove the Kosovars’ ability 
and willingness to rule themselves, the political 
bickering after the November 2001 elections produced 
a stalemate that only the new SRSG Steiner could 
resolve in March 2002. The net outcome was Ibrahim 
Rugova holding the Presidency and a coalition 
government of the main Albanian parties under Prime 
Minister Bajram Rexhepi. The electoral law granted 
the Serb minority and its Povratak coalition a 
substantial “overrepresentation” in the Assembly (22 
out of 120 seats). Yet, the elected assembly has in 
general refused to take into account legitimate minority 
concerns in the legislative process and has occasionally 
over-stepped its competencies. The “reserved powers” 
of UNMIK are those that really constitute a state under 
international law: budget, monetary policy, minority 
protection, external relations, security and the 
respecting of Res. 1244. On 7 March 2003, the 
Transfer Council of UNMIK and PISG was installed to 
manage the gradual transfer of competencies and 
responsibilities. Legally, the transfer to the PISG does 
not prejudice the final status as it could lead up both to 
substantial autonomy in a post-Yugoslav state and to 
independent statehood. 
It has often been stated that much, if not everything in 
Kosovo depends on the status question. As a return to 
the status quo ante in terms of sovereignty was 
considered unrealistic and as the international 
community rejected a territorial partition along ethnic 
lines, the ensuing stalemate of non-status was redefined 
as “gaining time.” Due to timetables in Kosovo and 
Serbia-and-Montenegro, the status issue cannot be 
postponed much longer. The quasi-moratorium on the 
status issue has contributed substantially to 
stabilisation and normalisation in the region, but the 
productive phase of temporising is coming to an end. 
Conditionalities, incentives and international pressure 
will only go so far in turning a weak state-like entity in 
a functioning state. The achievements of a virtuous 
circle of “standards before status” may easily be 
jeopardised by a subsequent vicious circle of 
politicking for final status – timing is of the essence.  
A regional framework of democratic states and basic 
stability has emerged, whereas the status issue sticks 
out more and more prominently as a factor hampering 
economic and political progress as well as Euro-
Atlantic integration for Kosovo and the Western 
Balkans. The domestic, regional and international 
context today may be far from ideal for a final solution 
to the Kosovo question, but it is equally hard to project 
short or medium-term changes that would make the 
circumstances really conducive for a negotiated 
arrangement.  
The past half-decade has underscored that the time 
horizons of international politics and the eager 
anticipation of the local communities tend to be 
incompatible with elongated processes of nation and 
state building. It remains to be seen, however, whether 
shortcuts in these processes – if available – provide 
real answers to the many fundamental challenges 
Kosovo faces, e.g. economic restructuring, societal 
reconciliation and European integration. 
Roadmaps and Roadblocks 
The status of Kosovo under international law is defined 
by UNSC Res. 1244 (and can thus be changed by 
another SC resolution only). Reaffirming the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the resolution 
authorises an international (military and civilian) 
interim administration to provide for Kosovo’s 
“substantial autonomy within the FRY.” Thus, both 
Yugoslav sovereignty and international transitional 
administration depend in duration on Res. 1244. 
Although the 1991-1992 Badinter Commission did not 
consider the option of independence for Kosovo, its 
criteria might be interpreted to include Kosovo, but not 
Republika Srpska and certainly not Northern Kosovo. 
Under the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, Kosovo was 
given the right to establish its own constitution, 
legislative power, and financial autonomy. The bodies 
of executive, legislative, and judicial powers (including 
constitutional courts) had the same status as those in 
the republics. Moreover, as far as the political and 
legislative process on the level of the federation was 
concerned, Kosovo was equal to the six republics and 
directly represented in the federal parliament, 
constitutional court, and presidency. Independence for 
Kosovo would upgrade the province’s borders to state 
borders, not change borders (as it would in the case of 
secession by the Republika Srpska, the Mitrovica or 
Tetovo regions). Typically, however, Res. 1244 does 
not refer to past Serbian models of autonomy for 
Kosovo, be it before and under the 1974 Constitution 
or after Milosevic’s revoking of Kosovo’s autonomy in 
1989.  
In the current situation, it is, however, for the 
international community a thin line between respecting 
de jure Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo and de 
facto administrating the protectorate, with both 
Prishtina and Belgrade keeping a jealous and vigilant 
watch. Recently, for instance, the former Prishtina 
court now acting out of Nis indicted the commander of 
the Kosovo Protection Corps citing a Serbian Interpol 
warrant. UNMIK rejected the arrest of the KPC 
commander with the argument that the Nis court acted 
as a Serb parallel institution for Kosovo and had no 
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jurisdiction. On at least three occasions Belgrade’s 
“virtual sovereignty” over Kosovo has ignited major 
political controversies, with more to come.  
Firstly, the fact that Res. 1244 referred to Kosovo as 
part of the FRY, but not as the autonomous province of 
Serbia it actually was, has added to the confusion. 
Some have argued that the fact that the FRY ceased to 
exist with the creation of Serbia-and-Montenegro has 
made Res. 1244 irrelevant and thus Kosovo 
independent by default. Another line of argument – 
even for those who refute that Kosovo is part of 
Yugoslavia – claims that Res. 1244 precludes a return 
to a status quo ante as constituent part of the Republic 
of Serbia. The Belgrade Agreement for the 
Restructuring of Relations between Serbia and 
Montenegro (14 March 2002) included an explicit 
precaution for a possible disintegration after three 
years: “If Montenegro withdraws from the state union, 
international documents related to the FRY, the U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1244 in particular, shall 
relate to and fully apply on Serbia as its successor.” 
The suggestion that this provision violates the UNSC 
resolution by re-introducing Serb sovereignty over 
Kosovo seems far-fetched: The UNSC, respecting 
Yugoslav sovereignty, could not deny Kosovo being an 
autonomous part of Serbia under (any) Yugoslav 
constitution and theoretically Serbia might uphold the 
defunct “shell” of the state union even after 
Montenegro’s secession, if only because of Kosovo. 
Secondly, for Kosovar leaders it is a must to protest 
any appearance of Serbian, Yugoslav or Serbia-and-
Montenegro’s sovereignty over Kosovo . The bilateral 
treaty on the rectification of the state border between 
FYROM and Yugoslavia was signed in February 2001. 
The clarification of the border delineation served the 
improvement of border patrolling on both sides (and 
thus may have contributed to the outbreak of violence 
in Macedonia by cracking down on grey zones). The 
Albanian leaders in Prishtina found it hard to stomach 
that the Belgrade authorities could rectify the border 
and thereby “give away” some 2,500 hectares of 
“their” territory. Formal respect of Yugoslav 
sovereignty and pragmatic reasons of border security 
made the UN and NATO accept the agreement.  
Thirdly, similar protests were provoked by the explicit 
reference to Kosovo as a province of Serbia in the 
preamble of the Constitutional Charter of the State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro (6 Feb. 2003): “the 
state of Serbia which includes the Autonomous 
Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Province 
of Kosovo and Metohija, the latter currently under 
international administration in accordance with UNSC 
Resolution 1244.” The upcoming new Serbian 
Constitution is bound to trigger a similar bout of 
protest. Neither party to the conflict will allow the 
tension to subside or the political hype of status to 
whither away. Second-track simulations and non-status 
negotiations certainly have their merits, but they will 
not scratch the surface of the status issue, even without 
the existing time constraints  
In hindsight, it is often argued that a window of 
opportunity for an “imposed” final status arrangement 
(i.e. independence) actually existed when Milosevic 
was still in power. Whether the Serbs would have 
accepted the loss of Kosovo as punishment for the 
regime’s crimes or whether Milosevic could have 
blamed it on the “unpatriotic” opposition remains a 
matter of speculation. Irrespective of self-serving 
Russian and Chinese opposition to Kosovo 
independence in the UNSC, the idea of Kosovo’s 
reintegration in a post-Yugoslav state gained some 
credence with the end of the Milosevic regime and the 
coming to power of the democratic and reform-
oriented DOS coalition in Belgrade. Additionally, it 
was argued that international pressure on the new 
democratic regime to settle the Kosovo issue might 
backfire and erode its popular backing in Serbia. For 
any Kosovar Albanian leader yielding one inch from 
the claim to full independence would be political 
suicide, as the status issue is not subjected to a costs-
and-benefits analysis. Although many reform 
politicians in the Democratic Party and G-17 are more 
than willing to give up on Kosovo in order to boost 
economic reforms and European integration, they will 
say so only behind closed doors. The landslide victory 
of nationalist parties (ranging from Kostunica’s DSS to 
Seselj’s SRS) only adds to this political taboo.  
 
The Future Status of Kosovo 
1. Independent statehood · conditional 
· unconditional 
2. Autonomy within · Serbia 
· Serbia-and-Montenegro 
3. Reintegration as third constituent part of the State Union 
of Serbia-and-Montenegro 
4. Permanent international protectorate 
5. EU integration 
 
Hypothetically, at least five main options for a future 
status of Kosovo are currently under discussion. At the 
end of the day, however, all options fall into three 
distinct categories; those that grant Belgrade any 
sovereign rights over Kosovo (autonomy, 
reintegration), those that do not (independence) and 
those that leave this question unanswered (permanent 
protectorate, EU integration). As national sovereignty 
is indivisible from an Albanian-Kosovar perspective 
and as Belgrade is ready to consider any option but 
independence, room for compromise seem to be non-
existent. The underlying logic of each option and the 
overall objectives of the international community are 
therefore key in deciding on the way forward. The 
international community’s principles may be 
summarised as:  
1. Functional: the prioritisation of a functioning state 
over a nation-state 
2. Final: a finality of Balkan state disintegration 
3. Fair: a fair arrangement respecting the rights of 
minorities without, however, thwarting the first 
two principles 
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The Kosovar position of independent statehood claims 
that international conditionalities concerning human 
and minority rights as well as a fully functional state 
will be fulfilled once Kosovar self-determination has 
run its course. The logic of the Kosovar position is that 
it would be unjust to have a Serbian or South-Slavic 
state/federation rule over Albanian Kosovo. The 
arguments range from ethno-demographic (national 
self-determination) to legal (Kosovo’s status under the 
SFRY constitution or the disintegration of the 
federation) to moral (Belgrade forfeiting its sovereign 
rights because of the atrocities committed by the 
Milosevic regime). Theoretically, independent 
statehood would not preclude a state restructuring 
within Kosovo through federalisation or cantonisation.  
The Serbian position of a restoration of sovereignty 
over Kosovo could theoretically involve a range of 
options. Irrespective of the fact that a restoration is 
unlikely and that Belgrade has not even begun to 
contemplate the practical consequences, Belgrade’s 
sovereignty could be implemented as an autonomous 
province of Kosovo either within the Republic of 
Serbia or within the State Union of Serbia-and-
Montenegro. The exercise of constructing an 
autonomous status for Kosovo under the State Union 
and the Constitutional Charter is quite academic as any 
effort in that direction would reach beyond the 
projected life span of the State Union and even if, the 
dissolution of the State Union would set Kosovo free 
with an undefined status under international law. The 
same basic argument of time constraints applies to the 
concept of a tripartite State Union. Harmonising three 
instead of two economic and legal systems into a State 
Union compatible with the EU Stabilisation and 
Association Process would be a mission impossible 
even without time pressure. Zoran Djindjic’s 
suggestion of a status for Kosovo in-between 
autonomy and third constituent of the state union was 
equally fuzzy. Thus, disregarding the current Kosovar 
position and assuming the velvet dissolution of the 
State Union by 2006, within the Serbian position 
autonomy within Serbia is the only “real” option. 
  
Serbia with Kosovo 
 Population (x1000)*  
Rep. of Serbia  9,397  
Vojvodina 2,031 21.6% 
Kosovo 1,900 20.2% 
Serbia proper  5,466 58.2% 
   
 Territory (sq km)  
Rep. of Serbia 88,361  100,0% 
Vojvodina 21,506 24.3% 
Kosovo 10,887 12.3% 
Serbia proper  55,968 63.3% 
   
 Nationalities (x1000)*  
Serbs 6,495 69.1% 
Albanians 1,734 18.4% 
Hungarians 293 3.1% 
Bosniaks 211 2.2% 
Others 666 7.1% 
Total 9,398 100,0% 
* Republic Statistical Office of Serbia (2002 census); 
Statistical Office of Kosovo (estimate) 
 
A prospective independent Serbia including an 
autonomous Kosovo would face serious new 
constitutional and ethnopolitical challenges. The 
quality of Kosovo’s autonomy would set a precedent 
for Vojvodina and with the increasing vigour of the 
autonomy movement in that region, only equal status 
to Kosovo would be acceptable. The fact that Kosovo’s 
autonomy under the 1974 constitution was linked as 
much to the SFRY as to the Republic of Serbia 
precludes a return to a status quo ante, but any new 
autonomy arrangement within Serbia for Kosovo, 
Vojvodina (and Sandzak?) would leave Belgrade with 
minimal, largely nominal sovereignty over these 
regions. The burden of transfers to Kosovo for 
economic development and security would easily top 
Tito’s system of compensations. With one-third of the 
territory under autonomous rule and almost one-third 
of non-Serb population overall, the ethno-demographic 
composition and constitutional set-up of the “new” 
state so desired by Serbian nationalists would destroy 
any illusions of a homogeneous, centralised nation-
state. More likely, in controlling and administrating 
Kosovo, Belgrade would have a state of war on its 
hands. 
The key distinction between the current process of 
“standards before status” and the often-propagated 
alternative solution of “conditional independence” is 
the ex ante determination of independence as the final 
status. The process leading from the definition of final 
status to the actual awarding of independence would 
then be the same; an (incremental) transfer of 
sovereign competencies under substantial international 
supervision and guarantees. In terms of sequencing 
transfer and standards, “conditional independence” is 
frontloaded compared to the backloaded “standards 
before status.” Logically, independence once awarded 
cannot be revoked and sovereign rights once 
transferred cannot be withdrawn. Thus, “conditional 
independence” in its practical implementation would 
be similar to the current situation in Bosnia with an 
OHR to uphold international standards and to move 
local politicking away from zero-sum games step-by-
step.  
The two “international” options of a permanent 
protectorate and European integration deserve closer 
scrutiny. The protectorate is hardly a long-term option 
in and by itself. On the one hand, both “standards 
before status” and “conditional independence” or even 
autonomy under Serbian sovereignty would imply an 
extended international (civilian and/or military) 
presence as guarantor in Kosovo. The well-known 
“unintended consequences” of protectorate 
arrangements such as the so-called “inflexibility trap” 
resulting in “frustrated societies, weak states and a 
crisis of democracy” are a stark argument against an 
unlimited continuation of this mode of governance. 
The 1999 promise of a “European perspective” for the 
Western Balkans evidently includes Kosovo. 
 6
Nevertheless, the idea of a European short cut for 
Kosovo is largely utopian. Some have argued that the 
transfer of sovereign rights in the process of EU 
integration might make the sorting-out of sovereignty 
over Kosovo between Belgrade and Prishtina a 
superfluous exercise or at least one that could be cut-
short by integrating Kosovo into the EU as it is. This 
shortcut has three drawbacks. Firstly, taking Kosovo’s 
inability to meet basic criteria as an excuse to reduce or 
forfeit conditionalities would undo the fundamental 
logic of EU integration strategies. Secondly, apart from 
the fact that sovereignty is generally seen as indivisible 
in the Balkans, the sovereign rights relegated to 
Brussels in the process of European integration are not 
those disputed between Prishtina and Belgrade. 
Thirdly, the EU can only negotiate a Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement (SAA) with a fully sovereign 
and functional state. In order to circumvent this 
dilemma and not to complicate the SAA preparations 
with the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro further, 
the EU has set up a Stabilisation and Association 
Process Tracking Mechanism (STM) for Kosovo. This 
joint technical working group of UNMIK, the PISG 
and the European Commission simulates the benefits 
of SAA preparations for the countries of the region in 
terms of norm-setting and policy guidance for EU-
compatible structural reforms. The outcome for 
Kosovo, however, cannot be the signing of an SAA. 
The government in Belgrade cannot be held 
responsible for the fulfilment of SAA criteria in 
Kosovo, nor can - to a large extent - the government in 
Prishtina. Judging by the track record of the other 
Balkan countries in the Stabilisation and Association 
Process so far, even an independent but weak Kosovar 
state would be an unlikely candidate for a fast track to 
EU membership. Conversely, the signing of an SAA 
with Serbia-and-Montenegro or, more likely, Serbia 
and Montenegro in the medium term - a feasibility 
report for Serbia and Montenegro is being prepared, 
but a ratified SAA before 2007 is unlikely - would 
have consequences for Kosovo too. Far-reaching 
autonomy within Serbia would create SAA problems 
similar to Bosnia’s and conditional independence 
would imply a separate SAA for Kosovo. Reform 
politicians in Belgrade therefore argue that progress on 
EU integration as well as on political and economic 
reforms would be much quicker without Kosovo (and 
without Montenegro).  
Options involving an exchange of population or 
territory would fly in the face of the most basic 
European principles and would certainly trigger an 
avalanche of similar claims in the region and beyond. 
These options may be (and are) used as threatening 
gestures, but are non-starters in an orderly final-status 
process. The same applies to possible “solutions” 
involving a partitioning of Kosovo along the (main) 
ethnic lines, with the Serb part joining Serbia and the 
Albanian part gaining independent statehood or 
revisiting visions of a Greater Albania. Accepting such 
a redrawing of borders would foster and legitimise 
similar ideas in Bosnia, Preshevo Valley and 
Macedonia – a slippery slope towards ethnic cleansing. 
More importantly, such a decision would condone the 
concept of Kosovo as a second, mono-ethnic nation-
state of the Albanians where minorities can at best be 
tolerated. Euphoric international promises to “restore” 
multicultural and multiethnic communities has 
subsided and the international community has come to 
accept pragmatic solutions in refugee return and related 
property issues. Yet, countering creeping endeavours to 
turn states and state-like entities into mono-ethnic 
constituencies by violent or other means remains a 
prime objective.  
Restructuring of Kosovo could be an option to 
accommodate ethnic minorities (i.e. the Serb 
population), both in a framework of conditional 
independence and as an autonomous province of 
Serbia. Federalisation would create two ethnically 
defined constituent entities within an independent 
Kosovo (similar to the Federation and the Republika 
Srpska within Bosnia-Herzegovina). A federalisation 
of Kosovo as a province of Serbia would be food for 
thought for experts in international and constitutional 
law. Due to the haphazard distribution of pockets of 
Serb population over Kosovo the territorial shape of 
the two entities would surpass the worst versions of the 
Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia. As the lessons of Dayton 
indicate, in either case the net result would be a 
political system deadlocked by ethnic loyalties, a 
plethora of practical problems and a multiplication of 
public institutions without corresponding increase in 
the functioning and output legitimacy of the “state.”  
Cantonisation originally refers to the classic and 
unique Swiss example of plural constituent parts of the 
state that are not ethnically defined. Since Dayton, 
cantonisation refers to a state arrangement consisting 
of multiple ethnically defined territorial units. The 
distribution of the Serb population in Kosovo would 
seem to favour such a way-out over federalisation. The 
price to pay would be the same: an uncontrolled 
multiplication of institutions and politics to the 
detriment of socio-economic realities – again a lesson 
learned from Bosnia.  
Typically, the workability of sub-state arrangements to 
accommodate minority communities requires a strong 
and prosperous state as well as a historical tradition. 
Otherwise, the outcome tends to be a weak, 
dysfunctional and de-legitimised state. The 
argumentative fallacy of both cantonisation and 
federalisation concerns the principle of reciprocity. 
The Albanian Kosovars argue that, because of their 
right to national self-determination or wartime 
atrocities, they cannot be part of or be ruled by a Serb-
dominated state. Reciprocally (albeit on a smaller 
scale), Serbs in Kosovo argue that, because of their 
right to national self-determination or post-war 
atrocities, they cannot be part of or be ruled by an 
Albanian-dominated state. Consequently, all state 
politics is ethnic politics. Cooperation between Serbs 
and Albanians is relegated either to the individual level 
or to the inter-state and the European level. In an 
independent Kosovo it would be hard to argue why the 
Serbs in Mitrovica should not have a claim to 
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maximum autonomy. In a re-integrated Serbia it would 
be equally hard to argue why the province of Kosovo 
should be partitioned ethnically with federal autonomy 
for the Serbs, whereas statehood should be refused to 
the Kosovo Albanians.  
Assuming that the status process were to result in 
acceptance of either conditional independence or 
autonomy within Serbia by the negotiating parties, then 
it would be up to the international community to apply 
the fundamental principles (functional, final and fair). 
Functionality of Kosovo as a state or autonomous 
entity would be highly problematic in any 
constellation, if only because of obstructionism by the 
Albanian Kosovars in the first or the Serb minority of 
Kosovo in the second case. Territorial solutions would 
create too many non-cooperative and rivalling levels of 
government, e.g. a Serb autonomous province within a 
Kosovo autonomous entity within the state of Serbia 
(itself a constituent republic of a State Union). The 
criterion of finality does not refer to the sustainability 
of such an arrangement, but rather to potential 
precedents for the region. A federalisation or 
cantonisation of Kosovo would be a precedent for 
Albanians in Macedonia. Independence would be a 
wake-up call for Serbs in Bosnia. Eventually, 
“precedent” is not a legal category, but rather the 
readiness of one or more parties to instrumentalise a 
specific case for their own ends. As a consequence, 
precedents can always be construed – the issue is rather 
how credible they are as a factor of public mobilisation 
and indignation. Conversely, the international 
community has to be able to make the case for the 
consistency and righteousness of its approach to 
various cases of nation and state building in the region. 
Lastly, although no binding legal norms and uniform 
practices exist for minority regimes in Europe, the 
criteria of state functionality and a finality to state 
fragmentation imply a certain correlation between 
distribution, relative and absolute size of a minority, on 
the one hand, and the extent of minority arrangements, 
on the other hand.  
Functional statehood hardly figures in the Belgrade and 
Prishtina visions of the future of Kosovo. It is either 
considered to be of secondary importance or an 
automatic consequence of restored statehood and 
national statehood respectively. Whereas a 
reintegration of Kosovo in whatever form would 
certainly unhinge the fragile political structures in 
Belgrade, Kosovars are inclined to show off their 
parallel underground institutions of the 1990s as a basis 
of statehood. In order to earth the extremely emotional 
and zero-sum debates in political reality, it would be 
advisable to challenge both parties to produce a 
concrete platform for future status - much along the 
lines of the initial negotiations between Belgrade and 
Podgorica. Platforms specifying constitutional 
arrangement for Kosovo autonomy in Serbia or 
minority protection regimes for Serbs in Kosovo 
respectively might have a sobering effect.  
All in all, the various options championed by Albanian 
and Serbian politicians are fatally reminiscent of the 
famous one-liner, “Why should I be a minority in your 
country, if you could be a minority in mine?”  
Nation and State Building Revisited 
As the endogenous capabilities in Belgrade and 
Prishtina to initiate a constructive process aimed at a 
mutually acceptable compromise arrangement for the 
final status of Kosovo are strictly limited, much if not 
everything depends on the “international community.” 
Although Russia also factors in as a potential veto 
power in a UNSC authorisation of a final status for 
Kosovo, constructive engagement mainly concerns the 
USA and the EU (or key EU members). 
With the international community equally deadlocked 
and largely unwilling to tackle the thorny Kosovo issue 
head-on, a breakthrough will likely depend on shifts in 
EU and/or US interests outside the Balkan conundrum. 
The recent shaping-up of the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and its enhanced willingness and 
the enhanced ability to handle military and policing 
operations has consequences for the Balkans and the 
transatlantic division of labour, but hardly impinges on 
the deadlocked status issue. 
Conversely, September 11th and the War on Terror 
have put into question several mainstays of 
international politics with several potential 
implications for the Western Balkans and Kosovo. In 
the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the 
logic consequence seemed to be an acceleration of the 
existing trend towards US political and military 
disengagement from a European region of marginal 
strategic relevance. Consequently, by the end of 2002 
the Kosovo Albanians who had banked on their 
“American allies” rather than the Europeans to support 
their drive for independence, felt that time was running 
out. The War on Terror, however, soon brought the 
Balkan back into the spotlight as a region of state 
weakness or failure and thus a potential safe haven for 
terrorism and organised crime. Many an ethnic conflict 
in the region was redefined overnight as part of the 
worldwide “fight against terrorism” (including 
Milosevic’s campaign against the KLA in 1998/99). 
The War on Terror, however, seemed to point to a 
preference for strong states ready to subordinate to US 
security concerns. It seems doubtful that this shift in 
international priorities would have improved the odds 
for independent statehood for Kosovo. 
Negative consequences for the international handling 
of the status issue seemed more obvious. Apart from 
the reorientation of US and European attention, 
possibly to the detriment of the Balkans in terms of 
human and financial resources, the aftermath of 
September 11th also constituted a challenge for post-
conflict stabilisation strategies in general. During the 
war in Afghanistan, the USA and its European allies 
agreed on a combination of military might and 
humanitarian aid. In the post-war phase, the diverging 
American and European philosophies of stabilisation 
and modernisation as well as the balancing of hard and 
soft power projection were bound to reappear. The 
USA’s preference for predefined exit strategies and a 
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quick transfer of power, on the one hand, and aversion 
against peace keeping and comprehensive post-conflict 
strategies, on the other hand, contrasted with the 
international handling of the Western Balkans since 
Dayton. The handling of Afghanistan by the Bush 
administration was reminiscent of Balkan exit 
strategies and a division of labour between US warfare 
and European post-war reconstruction. The trend 
towards short-lived strategic alliances and exit-
strategies did not bode well for a comprehensive and 
concerted Balkan strategy. European policies for the 
Balkans – based on a regional approach of intensive 
dialogue and perspectives of stabilisation and 
integration – might have been affected by proxy. 
Moreover, the transatlantic rift in connection with the 
2003 Iraq War may have nurtured Balkanic hopes that 
there would be ample opportunities to play the 
American and European powers off against each other 
in the Kosovo issue. Although these hopes were not 
totally unfounded, recent developments in post-Taliban 
Afghanistan and post-Saddam Iraq seem to give 
international and especially American interest in the 
Balkans and Kosovo yet another twist. 
For many US policy makers and thinks tanks “peace 
keeping” was a dirty word synonymous with losing 
sight of the US “national interest” in quagmires of 
regional conflicts without strategic relevance. 
Meanwhile, they have come around to shoulder the far 
more ambitious task of “nation building” in 
Afghanistan and Iraq – albeit typically understood in a 
reductionist manner subsuming “state building” and 
“society building” as corollaries of “nation building,” 
i.e. democratisation. The daunting task of 
democratising Afghanistan, Iraq and possible other 
former failed or rogue states urgently (in view of the 
upcoming presidential elections) calls for proof that it 
can be done, proof that military exit strategies and 
successful outside nation building are possible within 
an acceptable timeframe. Despite persistent signs of 
reluctance and dissension, at least the international 
community – unlike the parties to the conflict - seems 
to develop some drive and motivation to tackle and 
conclude the Kosovo status issue. 
Negotiating Kosovo 
The UNSC Resolution 1244 assigns UNMIK and the 
SRSG the task of “facilitating a political process 
designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking 
into account the Rambouillet Accords.” The ambiguity 
of the accords’ text, however, is unsurpassed: “Three 
years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an 
international meeting shall be convened to determine a 
mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the 
basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant 
authorities, each Party’s efforts regarding the 
implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki 
Final Act.” This one sentence raises a plethora of 
questions: What if the will of the people and the 
opinions of the relevant authorities turn out to be 
irreconcilable? Is the reference to the Helsinki Final 
Act a reminder that state borders are inviolable or does 
it make any solution conditional on a larger set of 
standards concerning human and minority rights, 
democracy and the rule of law?  
Even though Res. 1244 highlighted Yugoslav 
sovereignty over Kosovo and failed to mention the 
timeframe, Michael Steiner’s “standards before status” 
speech at the UN in April 2002 marked the end of this 
three-year time-out. His proposal was generally 
considered the best possible option given the 
circumstances, defining eight standards or benchmarks: 
1. functional state institutions; 
2. enforcement of the rule of law; 
3. freedom of movement; 
4. right of return for all Kosovars; 
5. market economic development; 
6. clarity of property title; 
7. normalised dialogue with Belgrade; and 
8. reduction and transformation of the Kosovo 
Protection Corps (KPC).  
Most of these benchmarks are related to state 
functionality and have to be addressed by the PISG. 
From a Kosovar perspective, making the opening of 
status negotiations conditional on them fulfilling 
certain standards is an incentive only if independence 
is the guaranteed or prejudiced outcome of the 
negotiations. Conversely, from a Serb perspective the 
“standards before status” formula provides no incentive 
for cooperation whatsoever and might even be 
understood as an invitation to obstruct and thwart 
progress on issues such as the Prishtina-Belgrade 
dialogue (7) or refugee return and freedom of 
movement (3-4). Thus, the fundamental flaw of 
“standards before status” is that it can unfold its 
incentive function for one party only and only if it 
prejudices the final status outcome. 
“Standards before status” opened the prospect of a 
mediated bilateral dialogue on non-status issues and 
UNMIK finally took its courage in both hands and 
sought to cut through the legal complexities of 
ownership and sovereignty. In June 2002, the Kosovo 
Trust Agency was established to administer publicly-
owned firms and begin the privatisation process on the 
basis of laws approved one month earlier. The fact that 
UNMIK no longer shuns status-related questions and 
since November 2003 even envisages a corresponding 
political process also reinvigorated political activity in 
Belgrade and Prishtina. Albanian politicians reiterated 
their position that Kosovo is independent and only 
awaits international recognition. They criticized that 
Steiner’s formula did not contain a roadmap and a 
timetable for independence. In Belgrade the Kosovo 
issue had been handled by Deputy Prime Minister 
Nebojsa Covic, who heads the government's 
Coordination Centre for Kosovo (CCK). In January 
2003, it was publicly announced that status 
negotiations should no longer be postponed, as further 
delays would only consolidate Kosovo’s de facto 
statehood, a trend unacceptable to Serbia. To underline 
his claim, Djindjic demanded the stationing of Serbian 
security forces in Kosovo and proposed the ethnic 
federalisation of Kosovo under Serbian sovereignty.  
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The ceremonial opening of “technical” negotiations 
between Prishtina and “Belgrade” in Vienna on 14 
October 2003 constituted a belated satisfaction for 
Michael Steiner, who had left Kosovo in the summer of 
that year. His political mantra of “standards before 
status” had brought Kosovars and Serbs to the Austrian 
capital. At the EU-Western Balkans Summit in 
Thessaloniki in June 2003 the mutual readiness to open 
negotiations had been celebrated. Irrespective of the 
question, whether Kosovo becomes an independent 
state in the medium terms or not, numerous practical 
questions thus far remained unanswered between the 
two neighbours, ranging from transport and license 
plates to energy supplies and telecommunication. In the 
harsh political realities of today, however, each and 
every protocolary decision and technical issue appears 
as the status question in disguise. In the UN mediated 
negotiations, each party to the conflict watches his 
opponent with eagle eyes to prevent the other from 
prejudicing the final status of Kosovo in his favour, 
while striving to do just that himself. The number of 
mantraps awaiting the UN negotiators is plenty.  
In the run-up to the negotiations, both parties – as was 
to be expected – brought up their big guns. In spring, 
the Kosovar Parliament threatened to declare 
independence and the Serb communities in northern 
Kosovo countered with the options of unification with 
Serbia or the creation of their own “Republika Srpska” 
within Kosovo. The Serbian Parliament and 
Government in Belgrade declared on 27 August that 
the only acceptable future status for Kosovo would be 
that of a province of Serbia, adding the return of Serb 
refugees and the Serbian army as conditions. In order 
not to negate the emotional next to the legal dimension, 
the Orthodox Church in Belgrade simultaneously 
epithetised Kosovo as “Serbia’s Jerusalem.” The 
parliament in Prishtina refused to debate the substance 
of the Vienna negotiations, to give the Rexhepi 
government a mandate and thereby assume 
responsibility for the upcoming bilateral talks. 
The breakthrough of sorts concerned the readiness of 
the Kosovar leadership and “Belgrade” to accept each 
other as negotiating parties. For Belgrade negotiations 
with Prishtina undermined the alleged status of Kosovo 
as merely a province of Serbia, whereas it had 
symbolic importance for Prishtina whether 
representatives of Serbia or Serbia-and-Montenegro 
were sitting on the opposite side of the table. Thus, on 
14 October 2003, the delegations met under the 
vigilant eye of the revived Contact Group, Lord 
George Robertson (NATO), Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
(OSCE) and Javier Solana (EU). Zoran Zivkovic, 
Prime Minister of Serbia, and by Nebojsa Covic, his 
Deputy and President of the Coordination Centre for 
Kosovo and Metohia, represented Serbia-and-
Montenegro. The last-minute withdrawal of Kosovar 
Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi was a major setback. 
Only President Ibrahim Rugova and Nedzad Daci, 
Chairman of the Assembly, arrived in Vienna. After a 
short meeting with high media coverage it was 
formally decided to install four working groups that 
were to meet alternately in Prishtina and Belgrade, 
starting in November, to deal with (1) electricity 
supply for Kosovo; (2) transport and 
telecommunications; (3) refugee return; and (4) 
missing persons. Meanwhile, the representatives of the 
Belgrade and Prishtina working groups have held their 
first meetings under international chairmanship. The 
first meeting of experts on 4 March 2004 in Prishtina 
(and due to reconvene in Belgrade on 1 April) deals 
with the least politicised issue - energy supply and 
environmental protection. The working groups for 
missing persons met on 9 March 2004 in Prishtina with 
the Kosovar delegation including both Milorad 
Todorovic as the responsible minister and UNMIK 
staff. The working groups on transport and 
telecommunications as well as the most controversial 
issue of the return of displaced persons are yet to hold 
their first meeting.  
After the meeting, Rugova underlined that Kosovo’s 
mind was firmly set on joining the EU and NATO as 
an independent country. In return, Covic noted that the 
past meeting had brought together representatives of 
the Republic of Serbia and the province of Kosovo. 
The uneasy mediating role of UNMIK is not only due 
to the single-mindedness with which the rivals had dug 
their heels in even before the “negotiations on issues of 
joint interest” had actually started. Paradoxically, the 
opening of technical negotiations as such not only 
constitutes a victory for the “standards before status” 
approach, but also its demise: In order to avoid the 
absurd situation of Kosovars and Serbs fighting at the 
negotiation table about issues that actually belong to 
the prerogatives of the third quasi-neutral party of 
UNMIK, Steiner had to transfer some more 
competencies to the institutions of provisional self-
government. This transfer collided with the “standards 
before status” logic, even though the opening of 
negotiations was one of the eight standards. 
In order to further complicate the pre-negotiations for 
the Vienna meeting, additional “parties” demanded 
access. The Serb minority in Kosovo insisted on 
having its own representative at the table. Following 
the same ethnic (versus state) logic, the Albanian 
minority in the Preshevo Valley reciprocally insisted 
on having its own representative present. In the 
Kosovo delegation the Serb Milorad Todorovic 
officially did not represent the ethnic minority, but was 
invited ex officio as minister. With Rexhepi’s 
withdrawal, Harri Holkeri felt compelled to disinvite 
Todorovic as well. 
The conclusion from the Vienna meeting is that the 
political leaders in Belgrade actually had no master 
plan for a sustainable and domestically acceptable 
solution for Kosovo. Nor had their interlocutors from 
Prishtina a concept for the Serb minority in the 
envisaged independent Kosovo. The fact that the 
international community seems equally helpless in 
dealing with the status question is more worrisome. A 
resounding victory for G17 and other reformers 
unwilling to let the status question block Serbia’s road 
to Europe in the December 2003 elections might have 
been helpful to unravel the Gordian knot. The victory 
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of the nationalist SRS has tied the hands of even the 
most liberal politicians in Belgrade. To top it all, 
voices linking a possible loss of Kosovo to the partition 
of Bosnia have already been heard from Banja Luka 
and Belgrade. Albanians from Preshevo Valley or the 
Tetovo region might be tempted to use violence to state 
their claim in the negotiation process or to stop the 
talks altogether. Recent unrest in Southern Serbia and 
Macedonia and violent clashes in Kosovo seem to 
indicate that the opening of a negotiation process more 
readily invokes the forces of the past than peaceable 
visionaries. 
As political constraints dictate and as several 
international simulations have proven, neither Serbs 
nor Albanians have any motivation to cooperate and 
initiate compromises. No incentives (economic 
assistance or even EU integration) and arm-twisting is 
likely to reach beyond bringing them to the negotiation 
table. Both sides will drive the internations up the wall 
by quarrelling over procedures and modalities and 
stonewalling any talks on substantive, status-related 
issues. Even if, in an unthinking moment, the two 
parties were to agree – their “solutions” involving 
partitionings and land-swaps would be blatantly 
unacceptable for the international community. By all 
appearances, with acknowledging the loss of Kosovo a 
political taboo in Belgrade, reformers tend to favour 
partitioning or federalisation and thus give up all but 
formal sovereignty over the rest of Kosovo. 
Conversely, nationalists talk of cantonisation, which 
implies an ambition to control all of Kosovo in one 
way or another. Overall, the Belgrade argument seem 
to have shifted from a historical claim to the protection 
of the Serb minority, pointing an accusing finger at the 
track record of the PISG, UNMIK and KFOR in 
minority protection and insisting on full 
implementation of Res. 1244.        
 
Timetable 
June 1999 UNSC Res. 1244 
Oct. 2000 Local elections in Kosovo 
Nov. 2001 Central elections in Kosovo 
March 2002 Belgrade Agreement between Serbia and 
Montenegro 
Feb. 2003 Proclamation of the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro 
Oct. 2003 Opening of UN-mediated negotiations 
between Belgrade and Prishtina in Vienna 
Nov. 2003 Announcement of mid-2005 as the timetable 
for status negotiations by the Contact Group 
Dec. 2003 Parliamentary elections in Serbia 
April 2003 Presidential elections in Serbia 
Oct. 2004 Parliamentary elections in Kosovo 
Spring 2005 Parliamentary elections in Serbia-and-
Montenegro 
Mid-2005 Review of standards for Kosovo, opening of 
status negotiations 
Feb. 2006 End of the 3-year moratorium on the 
Montenegro referendum 
?? UNSC Res. on the final status of Kosovo 
 
In sum, with “standards before status” and the opening 
of a negotiation process the status issue is back on the 
agenda (assuming it ever was “off the agenda”) and 
here to stay. The classic post-conflict approach of 
holding off controversial issues while re-establishing 
normal relations has run its course. If the logic of the 
State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was at least 
partly linked to Kosovo, the end of the moratorium by 
early 2006 and the likely dissolution of the Union set a 
firm time limit for the status of Kosovo. In the 
meantime, the various entries in the regional timetable 
(e.g. the upcoming elections in Serbia, Kosovo and 
Serbia-and-Montenegro) will keep the status issue in 
the newspapers.  
The benchmarks as specified by the current SRSG (see 
p. 21) are a tall call if not a mission impossible for the 
Kosovar leaders with little more than a year to go. A 
public commitment and the implementation of 
corresponding policies for a multiethnic Kosovo by 
Albanians leaders in Prishtina feature high on the list 
of tasks. Some of the benchmarks are rather general, 
e.g. the promotion of civil society, but others are highly 
demanding, e.g. a legal framework for investment or 
conditions for safe returns. Predictably, the outcome of 
the review of mid-2005 will have to be positive despite 
serious shortcomings on most benchmarks, with the 
Kosovars pointing to their limited competencies and 
Serb obstructionism and the Serbs arguing that the UN 
assessment is biased in favour of Kosovo 
independence. Political expediency and timetables are 
strongly against a further postponement of final-status 
negotiations, even though the non-status dialogue will 
not have shifted either partisan position on the status 
issue one inch. In seems a safe bet that no intense and 
“robust mediation,” no international package of 
incentives and pressure will bring the two parties closer 
to a consensual outcome for the final status 
negotiations. In the end, the parties to the conflict can 
wait, the international community cannot. Most likely, 
at the end of the day, the UN and the Contact Group 
will have to define a final status single-handedly.  
Final Status 
Finding middle ground between Prishtina and Belgrade 
positions might involve “independence without full 
sovereignty” or “full sovereignty without 
independence.” Precedents for such constellations are 
rare, but some have proven quite stable. Taiwan acts as 
an independent state, but is not a member of the UN 
and de jure remains a province of mainland China. 
Taiwan largely refrains from pushing the issue of 
recognised independent statehood, whereas Chinese 
threats to reassert its sovereignty by force have also 
subsided. After more than 30 years, Northern Cyprus 
continues to exist as a de facto state without 
international recognition. Fruitless negotiations kept 
the border between the two half of the island closed for 
decades, although violence subsided. Only the 
immediate prospect of EU membership seems to have 
opened a window of opportunity for a rapprochement 
and new status talks. The Ostpolitik  of West Germany 
vis-à-vis the GDR is another example of accepting 
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overriding international realities and creating 
possibilities for mutually beneficial cooperation and 
pragmatic coexistence without prejudicing 
fundamentally incompatible positions on state 
sovereignty. The British Commonwealth stands for a 
minimum of symbolic integration without a real 
transfer of sovereignty. The more or less constructive 
and at least stabilising outcome in each of these cases 
depended primarily on the willingness of the 
protagonists to respect the opposing claim, to accept 
the impossibility to find a functioning compromise and 
to work with the ensuing constellation. Typically, in 
each case the protagonists were state (or state-like 
entities) without violent “pressure groups,” ethnic 
minorities or “age-old” ethnic hatreds. 
As the Kosovo status issue definitely does not fulfil 
any of these preconditions, the international 
community has to prepare a scenario for the likely case 
of deadlocked status negotiations on the basis of its 
own principles – functional, final and fair. Postponing 
either the deadline for the beginning of status 
negotiations or the one for their conclusion is not an 
option with so many actors interested in blocking the 
negotiation process. As vested interests ranging from 
nationalist politicians to organised crime thrive on 
fuzzy arrangements and fuzzy timetables, the new 
status of Kosovo would have to be clear and 
enforceable. “Standards before status” has no incentive 
for Belgrade and as the issue of state functionality in 
Kosovo is unlikely ever to have an impact on the status 
debate in far-away Belgrade (but may one day in 
Prishtina and Mitrovica). The UN should fix an end 
date for status negotiations in advance and define an 
authoritative alternative: “no” to the Belgrade agenda 
and “no” to the Prishtina agenda.  
Ideally, the issues of Belgrade’s sovereignty over 
Kosovo and Prishtina’s sovereign statehood should be 
separated. Currently, a triple deadlock exists. The 
international deadlock concerns the threat of a veto in 
the UNSC against national determination leading to 
secession and independence. The bilateral deadlock is 
Prishtina’s and Belgrade’s incapability and 
unwillingness to compromise on the status issue with 
no perspective whatsoever for the international 
community to sway leaders on either side. The local 
deadlock concerns the standoff between Albanians and 
Serbs in Kosovo. The Albanians insist on turning 
“standards before status” upside down. The Serbs are 
well aware of the international deadlock, which 
reduces their already non-existent readiness to 
negotiate the status issue even further. Local Serbs are 
equally aware of Belgrade’s unwavering support and 
pertinent position on the status issue, which reinforces 
their unwillingness to come to terms with Kosovo. As 
the bilateral deadlock cannot be broken, the 
international deadlock is the key.  
The proposed alternative is the annulment of Res. 1244 
and Belgrade’s sovereignty to be replaced by a full UN 
trusteeship rather than conditional independence. The 
fake option or lever of a restoration of Belgrade’s 
sovereignty over Kosovo should be scrapped. It 
nurtures political illusionism in Belgrade and provides 
Kosovar politicians with an excuse to dodge the real 
issues. The Contact Group ought to prepare the ground 
for new UN resolution annulling Res. 1244 and thereby 
ending Belgrade’s sovereignty over Kosovo and 
transferring full sovereignty – not to Prishtina, but to 
the UN in New York. A UN trusteeship would 
eliminate the bilateral deadlock in status negotiations 
and create much better prospects for non-status 
negotiations. Similarly, once the Kosovo Serbs are in a 
situation similar to other Serb minorities (without 
parallel institutions or overriding loyalty to Belgrade), 
they will have to engage with Prishtina and might 
negotiate some for of autonomy within Kosovo. The 
“reserved powers” of UNMIK and the SRSG would 
largely remain the same – international representation, 
minority protection and security. The normal political 
process and the functioning of the state would be put in 
the hands of a representative government under the 
oversight of a High Representative much like in 
Bosnia. 
Such a UN trusteeship in Europe would have the 
advantage of clarifying (or at least simplifying) the 
issue of sovereignty and leave the negotiations on 
“succession issues” with Belgrade to the UN. In 
Kosovo the trusteeship would create the basic 
preconditions for large-scale privatisation and 
economic development (but without the hollow 
promises of independence). The UN and its civilian 
and security institutions in Kosovo would have to 
provide and implement solid guarantees for the Serb 
minority and Belgrade would have every right to be 
particularly vigilant and demanding vis-à-vis the UN 
and UNMIK/KFOR in this respect. The Serb minority 
would have to engage with the PISG and abolish all 
parallel institutions. Belgrade’s influence on Kosovo 
would be channelled via the UN, not back-channelled 
via Mitrovica. The Albanian Kosovars would not gain 
independence, but they would lose the threat of 
“Yugoslav” restoration. The trusteeship would be a 
demanding strategy for the international community 
and the UN in particular, but it might produce a 
functioning state; it would be final by not creating a 
precedent for further state disintegration; and it would 
allow for fair arrangements with the Serb minority 
without upturning functionality or finality. 
 
Wim van Meurs, CAP Munich 
March 2004 
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DOCUMENTS 
UN Security Council Resolution 1244  
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th 
meeting, on 10 June 1999 
The Security Council, 
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, and the primary 
responsibility of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, 
Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 
1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) 
of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999, 
Regretting that there has not been full compliance with 
the requirements of these resolutions, 
Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation 
in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to 
provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and 
displaced persons to their homes, 
Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo 
population as well as all terrorist acts by any party, 
Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General 
on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the 
humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo, 
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced 
persons to return to their homes in safety, 
Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Welcoming the general principles on a political 
solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 
(S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming 
also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of 
the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 
(S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that 
paper, 
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the 
region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2, 
Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for 
substantial autonomy and meaningful self-
administration for Kosovo, 
Determining that the situation in the region continues 
to constitute a threat to international peace and 
security, 
Determined to ensure the safety and security of 
international personnel and the implementation by all 
concerned of their responsibilities under the present 
resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis 
shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and 
as further elaborated in the principles and other 
required elements in annex 2; 
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia of the principles and other required 
elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and 
demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation; 
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to 
violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and 
complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of 
all military, police and paramilitary forces according to 
a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the 
international security presence in Kosovo will be 
synchronized; 
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number 
of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel 
will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the 
functions in accordance with annex 2; 
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United 
Nations auspices, of international civil and security 
presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel 
as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences; 
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in 
consultation with the Security Council, a Special 
Representative to control the implementation of the 
international civil presence, and further requests the 
Secretary-General to instruct his Special 
Representative to coordinate closely with the 
international security presence to ensure that both 
presences operate towards the same goals and in a 
mutually supportive manner; 
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international 
organizations to establish the international security 
presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 
with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities 
under paragraph 9 below; 
8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of 
effective international civil and security presences to 
Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in 
their deployment; 
9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international 
security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo 
will include: 
(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and 
where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the 
withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of 
Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary 
forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2; 
(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required 
in paragraph 15 below; 
(c) Establishing a secure environment in which 
refugees and displaced persons can return home in 
safety, the international civil presence can operate, a 
transitional administration can be established, and 
humanitarian aid can be delivered; 
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(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the 
international civil presence can take responsibility for 
this task; 
(e) Supervising demining until the international civil 
presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility 
for this task; 
(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely 
with the work of the international civil presence; 
(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required; 
(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement 
of itself, the international civil presence, and other 
international organizations; 
10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the 
assistance of relevant international organizations, to 
establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in 
order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo 
under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy 
substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional 
administration while establishing and overseeing the 
development of provisional democratic self-governing 
institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and 
normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo; 
11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the 
international civil presence will include: 
(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final 
settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-
government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 
and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); 
(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions 
where and as long as required; 
(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of 
provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous 
self-government pending a political settlement, 
including the holding of elections; 
(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, 
its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and 
supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local 
provisional institutions and other peace-building 
activities; 
(e) Facilitating a political process designed to 
determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account 
the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); 
(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority 
from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions 
established under a political settlement; 
(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure 
and other economic reconstruction; 
(h) Supporting, in coordination with international 
humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster 
relief aid; 
(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including 
establishing local police forces and meanwhile through 
the deployment of international police personnel to 
serve in Kosovo; 
(j) Protecting and promoting human rights; 
(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all 
refugees and displaced persons to their homes in 
Kosovo; 
12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian 
relief operations, and for the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by 
humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with 
such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective 
delivery of international aid; 
13. Encourages all Member States and international 
organizations to contribute to economic and social 
reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees 
and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context 
the importance of convening an international donors' 
conference, particularly for the purposes set out in 
paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date; 
14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, 
including the international security presence, with the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; 
15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo 
Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions 
and comply with the requirements for demilitarization 
as laid down by the head of the international security 
presence in consultation with the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General; 
16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 
8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and 
related matériel for the use of the international civil and 
security presences; 
17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union 
and other international organizations to develop a 
comprehensive approach to the economic development 
and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo 
crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact 
for South Eastern Europe with broad international 
participation in order to further the promotion of 
democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional 
cooperation; 
18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate 
fully in the implementation of all aspects of this 
resolution; 
19. Decides that the international civil and security 
presences are established for an initial period of 12 
months, to continue thereafter unless the Security 
Council decides otherwise; 
20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the 
Council at regular intervals on the implementation of 
this resolution, including reports from the leaderships 
of the international civil and security presences, the 
first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the 
adoption of this resolution; 
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
Annex 1 
Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the 
meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the 
Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999 
The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following 
general principles on the political solution to the 
Kosovo crisis: 
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- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and 
repression in Kosovo; 
- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and 
paramilitary forces; 
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil 
and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the 
United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the 
achievement of the common objectives; 
- Establishment of an interim administration for 
Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the 
United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and 
normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo; 
- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced 
persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by 
humanitarian aid organizations; 
- A political process towards the establishment of an 
interim political framework agreement providing for a 
substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full 
account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles 
of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the 
region, and the demilitarization of the KLA; 
- Comprehensive approach to the economic 
development and stabilization of the crisis region. 
Annex 2 
Agreement should be reached on the following 
principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo 
crisis: 
1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and 
repression in Kosovo. 
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, 
police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid 
timetable. 
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations 
auspices of effective international civil and security 
presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII 
of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the 
achievement of common objectives. 
4. The international security presence with substantial 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must 
be deployed under unified command and control and 
authorized to establish a safe environment for all 
people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to 
their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. 
5. Establishment of an interim administration for 
Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence 
under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy 
substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of 
the United Nations. The interim administration to 
provide transitional administration while establishing 
and overseeing the development of provisional 
democratic self-governing institutions to ensure 
conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all 
inhabitants in Kosovo. 
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav 
and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to 
perform the following functions: 
- Liaison with the international civil mission and the 
international security presence; 
- Marking/clearing minefields; 
- Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites; 
- Maintaining a presence at key border crossings. 
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced 
persons under the supervision of the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and 
unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid 
organizations. 
8. A political process towards the establishment of an 
interim political framework agreement providing for 
substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full 
account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles 
of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the 
region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations 
between the parties for a settlement should not delay or 
disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing 
institutions. 
9. A comprehensive approach to the economic 
development and stabilization of the crisis region. This 
will include the implementation of a stability pact for 
South-Eastern Europe with broad international 
participation in order to further promotion of 
democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional 
cooperation. 
10. Suspension of military activity will require 
acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition 
to agreement to other, previously identified, required 
elements, which are specified in the footnote below.1 A 
military-technical agreement will then be rapidly 
concluded that would, among other things, specify 
additional modalities, including the roles and functions 
of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo: 
Withdrawal 
- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, 
detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in 
Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn; 
Returning personnel 
- Equipment associated with returning personnel; 
- Terms of reference for their functional 
responsibilities; 
- Timetable for their return; 
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation; 
- Rules governing their relationship to the international 
security presence and the international civil mission. 
Note 1: Other required elements: 
- A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, 
meaning, e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal and 
air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre 
mutual safety zone within 48 hours; 
- Return of personnel for the four functions specified 
above will be under the supervision of the international 
security presence and will be limited to a small agreed 
number (hundreds, not thousands); 
- Suspension of military activity will occur after the 
beginning of verifiable withdrawals; 
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- The discussion and achievement of a military-
technical agreement shall not extend the previously 
determined time for completion of withdrawals. 
 
Constitutional Framework for Provisional 
Self-Government 
UNMIK/REG/2001/9 - 15 May 2001 
 
Preamble 
The Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
(SRSG), 
Pursuant to the authority given to him under United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1244(1999) of 10 
June 1999 (UNSCR 1244(1999)); 
Recalling that UNSCR 1244(1999) envisages the 
setting-up and development of meaningful self-
government in Kosovo pending a final settlement; 
Acknowledging Kosovo's historical, legal and 
constitutional development; and taking into 
consideration the legitimate aspirations of the people of 
Kosovo to live in freedom, in peace, and in friendly 
relations with other people in the region; 
Emphasizing that, since its establishment, the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) has supported and assisted the people of 
Kosovo and has worked towards this aim by enabling 
them to take responsibility gradually for the 
administration of Kosovo through the establishment of 
the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS); 
Considering that, building on the efforts undertaken by 
UNMIK and on the achievements of JIAS, including 
the valuable contribution by the people of Kosovo, and 
with a view to the further development of self-
government in Kosovo, Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government in the legislative, executive and judicial 
fields shall be established through the participation of 
the people of Kosovo in free and fair elections; 
Determining that, within the limits defined by UNSCR 
1244(1999), responsibilities will be transferred to 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government which 
shall work constructively towards ensuring conditions 
for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of 
Kosovo, with a view to facilitating the determination of 
Kosovo's future status through a process at an 
appropriate future stage which shall, in accordance 
with UNSCR 1244(1999), take full account of all 
relevant factors including the will of the people; 
Considering that gradual transfer of responsibilities to 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government will, 
through parliamentary democracy, enhance democratic 
governance and respect for the rule of law in Kosovo; 
Endeavouring to promote economic prosperity in 
Kosovo and the welfare of its people through the 
development of a market economy; 
Affirming that the exercise of the responsibilities of the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo 
shall not in any way affect or diminish the ultimate 
authority of the SRSG for the implementation of 
UNSCR 1244(1999); 
Taking into account the Charter of the United Nations; 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the Protocols thereto; the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child; the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and the Protocols thereto; the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; the 
Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities; and other relevant 
principles reflected in internationally recognized legal 
instruments; 
Recognizing the need to fully protect and uphold the 
rights of all Communities of Kosovo and their 
members; 
Reaffirming the commitment to facilitating the safe 
return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes 
and their exercise of the right to recover their property 
and possessions, and the commitment to creating 
conditions for freedom of movement for all persons; 
Recognizing the importance of creating a free, open 
and safe environment which facilitates the participation 
of all persons including all members of Communities 
in the process of establishing democratic institutions of 
self-government; 
Hereby promulgates the following: 
Chapter 1. Basic Provisions 
1.1 Kosovo is an entity under interim international 
administration which, with its people, has unique 
historical, legal, cultural and linguistic attributes. 
1.2 Kosovo is an undivided territory throughout which 
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
established by this Constitutional Framework for 
Provisional Self-Government (Constitutional 
Framework) shall exercise their responsibilities. 
1.3 Kosovo is composed of municipalities, which are 
the basic territorial units of local self-government with 
responsibilities as set forth in UNMIK legislation in 
force on local self-government and municipalities in 
Kosovo. 
1.4 Kosovo shall be governed democratically through 
legislative, executive, and judicial bodies and 
institutions in accordance with this Constitutional 
Framework and UNSCR 1244(1999). 
1.5 The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
are: 
(a) Assembly; 
(b) President of Kosovo; 
(c) Government; 
(d) Courts; and 
(e) Other bodies and institutions set forth in this 
Constitutional Framework. 
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1.6 The seat of the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government is Pristina. 
1.7 The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
shall use only such symbols as are or as may be set 
forth in UNMIK legislation. 
Chapter 2. Principles to be Observed by the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and 
their officials shall: 
(a) Exercise their authorities consistent with the 
provisions of UNSCR 1244(1999) and the terms set 
forth in this Constitutional Framework; 
(b) Promote and fully respect the rule of law, human 
rights and freedoms, democratic principles and 
reconciliation; and 
(c) Promote and respect the principle of the division of 
powers between the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary. 
Chapter 3. Human Rights 
[…] 
Chapter 4. Rights of Communities and Their 
Members 
General Provisions 
4.1 Communities of inhabitants belonging to the same 
ethnic or religious or linguistic group (Communities) 
shall have the rights set forth in this Chapter in order to 
preserve, protect and express their ethnic, cultural, 
religious, and linguistic identities. 
4.2 No person shall be obliged to declare to which 
Community he belongs, or to declare himself a member 
of any Community. No disadvantage shall result from 
an individual's exercise of the right to declare or not 
declare himself a member of a Community. 
4.3 The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
shall be guided in their policy and practice by the need 
to promote coexistence and support reconciliation 
between Communities and to create appropriate 
conditions enabling Communities to preserve, protect 
and develop their identities. The Institutions also shall 
promote the preservation of Kosovo's cultural heritage 
of all Communities without discrimination. 
Rights of Communities and Their Members 
[…] 
Protection of Rights of Communities and Their 
Members 
4.5 The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
shall ensure that all Communities and their members 
may exercise the rights specified above. The 
Provisional Institutions also shall ensure fair 
representation of Communities in employment in 
public bodies at all levels. 
4.6 Based on his direct responsibilities under UNSCR 
1244(1999) to protect and promote human rights and to 
support peace-building activities, the SRSG will retain 
the authority to intervene as necessary in the exercise 
of self-government for the purpose of protecting the 
rights of Communities and their members. 
Chapter 5. Responsibilities of the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government 
5.1 The Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
shall have responsibilities in the following fields: 
(a) Economic and financial policy; 
(b) Fiscal and budgetary issues; 
(c) Administrative and operational customs activities; 
(d) Domestic and foreign trade, industry and 
investments; 
(e) Education, science and technology; 
(f) Youth and sport; 
(g) Culture; 
(h) Health; 
(i) Environmental protection; 
(j) Labour and social welfare; 
(k) Family, gender and minors; 
(l) Transport, post, telecommunications and 
information technologies; 
(m) Public administration services; 
(n) Agriculture, forestry and rural development; 
(o) Statistics; 
(p) Spatial planning; 
(q) Tourism; 
(r) Good governance, human rights and equal 
opportunity; and 
(s) Non-resident affairs. 
[…] 
Chapter 6. Law and Order 
[…] 
Chapter 7. Kosovo Protection Corps 
[…] 
Chapter 8. Powers and Responsibilities Reserved to 
the SRSG 
8.1 The powers and responsibilities of the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government shall not include 
certain reserved powers and responsibilities, which will 
remain exclusively in the hands of the SRSG. These 
reserved powers shall include: 
(a) Full authority to ensure that the rights and interests 
of Communities are fully protected; 
(b) Dissolving the assembly and calling for new 
elections in circumstances where the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government are deemed to act in a 
manner which is not in conformity with UNSCR 
1244(1999), or in the exercise of the SRSG's 
responsibilities under that Resolution. The SRSG shall 
exercise this power after consultation with the 
President of Kosovo. The Assembly may, by a decision 
supported by two-thirds of its members, request the 
SRSG to dissolve the Assembly. Such a request shall 
be communicated to the SRSG by the President of 
Kosovo; 
(c) Final authority to set the financial and policy 
parameters for, and to approve, the Kosovo 
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Consolidated Budget, acting on the advice of the 
Economic and Fiscal Council; 
(d) Monetary policy; 
(e) Establishing arrangements for the independent 
external audit of the Kosovo Consolidated Budget; 
(f) Exercising control and authority over the UNMIK 
Customs Service; 
(g) Exercising final authority regarding the 
appointment, removal from office and disciplining of 
judges and prosecutors; 
(h) Deciding upon requests regarding the assignment of 
international judges and prosecutors, as well as change 
of venue, in accordance with the relevant UNMIK 
legislation in force; 
(i) Exercising powers and responsibilities of an 
international nature in the legal field; 
(j) Exercising authority over law enforcement 
institutions and the correctional service, both of which 
include and are supported by local staff; 
(k) Exercising control and authority over the Kosovo 
Protection Corps; 
(l) Exercising control and authority over the 
management of the administration and financing of 
civil security and emergency preparedness. 
Responsibility shall be gradually assumed by the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government; 
(m) Concluding agreements with states and 
international organizations in all matters within the 
scope of UNSCR 1244 (1999); 
(n) Overseeing the fulfilment of commitments in 
international agreements entered into on behalf of 
UNMIK; 
(o) External relations, including with states and 
international organisations, as may be necessary for the 
implementation of his mandate. In exercising his 
responsibilities for external relations, the SRSG will 
consult and co-operate with the Provisional Institutions 
of Self-Government with respect to matters of concern 
to the institutions; 
(p) Control over cross-border/boundary transit of goods 
(including animals). The Provisional Institutions of 
Self-Government shall co-operate in this regard; 
(q) Authority to administer public, state and socially-
owned property in accordance with the relevant 
UNMIK legislation in force, in cooperation with the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government; 
(r) Regulation of public and socially-owned enterprises 
after having consulted the Economic and Fiscal 
Council and the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government; 
(s) Administrative control and authority over railways, 
frequency management and civil aviation functions. 
Certain administrative functions shall be carried out by 
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and the 
relevant independent regulatory bodies; 
(t) Control and authority over the Housing and 
Property Directorate, including the Housing Claims 
Commission; 
(u) Defining the jurisdiction and competence for the 
resolution of commercial property disputes; 
(v) Preserving the existing boundaries of 
municipalities; 
(w) Responsibility to ensure that the system of local 
municipal administration functions effectively based on 
internationally recognized and accepted principles; 
(x) Appointing the members of the Economic and 
Fiscal Council, the Governing Board of the Banking 
and Payments Authority of Kosovo, the chief 
executives of the Customs Service and Tax 
Inspectorate, and the Auditor General; convening and 
presiding over the Economic and Fiscal Council; 
(y) Appointing international experts to the managing 
boards or commissions of the public broadcaster, the 
independent media regulatory body and other 
institutions involved in regulating the mass media, with 
the proviso that the number of such SRSG nominations 
will not constitute the majority of any such managing 
board or commission; 
(z) Control and authority over the civil registry 
database, which shall be maintained in cooperation 
with the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. 
8.2 The SRSG shall coordinate closely with the 
International Security Presence (KFOR) in: 
(a) Conducting border monitoring duties; 
(b) Regulating possession of firearms; 
(c) Enforcing public safety and order; and 
(d) Exercising functions that may be attributed to the 
domain of defence, civil emergency and security 
preparedness. 
Chapter 9. Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government 
[…] 
Chapter 10. Ombudsperson 
[…] 
Chapter 11. Independent Bodies and Offices 
[…] 
Chapter 12. Authority of the SRSG 
The exercise of the responsibilities of the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government under this 
Constitutional Framework shall not affect or diminish 
the authority of the SRSG to ensure full 
implementation of UNSCR 1244(1999), including 
overseeing the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government, its officials and its agencies, and taking 
appropriate measures whenever their actions are 
inconsistent with UNSCR 1244(1999) or this 
Constitutional Framework. 
Chapter 13. Authority of KFOR 
Nothing in this Constitutional Framework shall affect 
the authority of the International Security Presence 
(KFOR) to fulfil all aspects of its mandate under 
UNSCR 1244(1999) and the Military Technical 
Agreement (Kumanovo Agreement). 
Chapter 14. Final Provisions 
[…] 
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Signed on this 15th day of May 2001. 
Hans Haekkerup 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
 
Address to the Security Council by Michael 
Steiner 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, 
Wednesday, 24 April 2002 (UNMIK/PR719) 
Mr. President, Members of the Council, 
I am pleased to tell you that the UN operation in 
Kosovo under Resolution 1244 has entered a new 
phase, allowing us to make new proposals for the way 
ahead. 
In the period from June 1999 UNMIK concentrated on 
the humanitarian crisis, essential services and on 
stopping open hostilities, with KFOR's support. Indeed, 
the Kosovo where my predecessors arrived looked very 
different from Kosovo today. 
I. What Has Been Achieved? 
You have seen the comprehensive report of the 
Secretary-General. His support has been invaluable in 
our work. 
Government: The Kosovo-wide elections in November 
were universally recognised as free and fair. The 
Assembly, the President and the multi-ethnic 
Government of Kosovo are now in place and working. 
We are building an inclusive public service. We have 
set aside more than 20 % of posts to non-majority 
communities, 18% to Kosovo Serbs. 
Police and justice: We have a functioning police and 
justice system. The crime rate has gone down steadily. 
There were 500 murders during the second half of 
1999, 250 in 2000, and 136 last year. Since January 
2002 there have been 16 and, if this trend continues, 
we can expect less than 100 murders this year. 
The economy: It is slowly beginning to function. The 
2002 Kosovo Consolidated Budget of 374 million 
Euros is now over 95 per cent funded from local taxes 
and revenues. Starting this month, people are paying 
income taxes. More than 50,000 businesses have been 
registered. There has been a four-fold increase in the 
rate of electricity production since 1999. 
Public services: The social infrastructure has been 
rebuilt from scratch. We have more than 1,100 schools 
with a total of 450,000 pupils. Five regional hospitals 
have been refurbished and equipped. There are 360 
functioning health care facilities throughout Kosovo. 
130,000 pensioners will start receiving pensions as of 
July 2002. 
II. Priorities 
Now we have the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government (PISG). What has changed? Until now the 
mission had a general view of where it was headed, but 
we didn't see how it would get there. Now we can see 
more clearly how to structure the path. The road is not 
endless. We have a vision on how to finish our job. 
We need to look both inside and outside. We need to 
transfer authority within Kosovo to the Provisional 
Government. We also need to convince the Kosovans 
to look beyond Kosovo to Belgrade and to the region. 
What are our priorities? 
Firstly Reliable institutions: We now have Kosovan 
partners that we can work with: President Rugova, 
Prime Minister Rexhepi and Assembly President Daci. 
We need to consolidate the Provisional Institutions, to 
ensure that they are effective, representative and 
transparent. We will make a particular effort to ensure 
their multi-ethnic character at all levels. The Kosovo 
Serbs have agreed to my proposals for their 
participation in the Government. They will nominate a 
Minister for Agriculture, as well as an Inter-Ministerial 
Coordinator on Returns. This is significant progress. 
On the local level, the OSCE-run municipal elections 
this autumn will be key. There are good reasons why 
especially the Kosovo Serbs want these elections now. 
Secondly Boosting the economy: 50% unemployment 
rate is an untenable situation. At the same time, 
UNMIK is downsizing. There has already been a 
substantial drop in donor money. And Kosovo is 
unable to borrow on the international markets. Getting 
the economic fundamentals right is therefore even 
more important. A key element is privatisation. 
Privatisation will not solve the problem in the short 
term, but it is the only basis for secure jobs in the long-
term. The legislation to create the Kosovo Trust 
Agency, which will be the vehicle for privatisation, is 
now with the Provisional Government for comments. 
Thirdly Rule of law: Effective police and judiciary are 
essential. We will gradually transfer policing 
responsibilities to the multi-ethnic Kosovo Police 
Force under UNMIK supervision. Let me pay tribute 
here to the brave UNMIK policemen and women. The 
Polish Special Police demonstrated their dedication 
recently in an exemplary manner. We are also 
enhancing capabilities to effectively combat organised 
crime, terrorism and corruption. However, I must 
emphasise that as we begin to make significant arrests 
against the criminal gangs, we should anticipate a 
criminal backlash. Commander KFOR General Marcel 
Valentin and I stand shoulder to shoulder on 
maintaining order. We must count on your support - 
particularly when the going gets tough. 
Finally Returns: Now that the Kosovo Serbs will be 
part of the government, we can focus more efficiently 
on an integrated effort to facilitate return. The years 
2002 and 2003 will be decisive. We are committed to 
create the preconditions for a substantial returns 
process. Damage assessments in over 80 minority 
villages and urban areas have been completed. Serb 
returns to 14 villages and non-Serb minority returns to 
7 locations should commence within the next three 
months. The Kosovo Serbs will have their official 
representatives working on returns within the 
Government and in my office. It is time to work on a 
real breakthrough in returns. For this I must ask for 
your help. When the returns start, on the basis of our 
integrated approach, we need to be sure that there will 
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be money to follow the returnees. Only this way can 
we achieve sustainable returns. 
Here I would like to make a more general point that 
relates to the previous one. We need to follow a dual 
track approach. Multi-ethnicity and integration are the 
two mutually reinforcing elements here. On the one 
hand, the Kosovo Albanians as the majority 
community have to practice what their leaders preach. 
Multi-ethnicity means doing everything they can to 
encourage the smaller communities to stay in Kosovo 
and to make returns possible. On the other hand, the 
smaller communities have to participate in the 
institutions that we have set up under Resolution 1244. 
They must integrate and abandon parallel structures. 
The rule of law must apply everywhere in Kosovo. 
This is also true for Mitrovica. 
There will be no multi-ethnicity without integration. 
But there will also be no integration without multi-
ethnicity. 
Integration within Kosovo needs to be complemented 
by strengthening relations with Belgrade as well as the 
cooperation within the region. Just as Kosovo is a 
factor influencing stability within the region, relations 
with regional neighbours influence stability in Kosovo. 
I have already made my first trips to Belgrade, Skopje, 
Tirana and Sarajevo. We will continue to foster 
regional dialogue both on the bilateral and the 
multilateral level. Belgrade will be the crucial partner 
in this process. 
III. Benchmarks 
I have described the priorities of my Mission. The 
work of implementing Resolution 1244 is now a joint 
effort with the Provisional Institutions. 
We are transferring our responsibilities to these 
institutions in the process of building substantial 
autonomy. This will bring us closer to a stage when it 
is time to begin the political process designed to 
determine Kosovo's future status. This will be one of 
my main responsibilities, as foreseen in paragraph 
11(e) of Resolution 1244. 
But the time for this has not yet come. Kosovo society 
and institutions will have to show that they are ready 
for this process - without prejudging its outcome. We 
must make clear what is expected from them. 
Therefore, I am embarking on a benchmarks process. 
These benchmarks should be achieved before 
launching a discussion on status, in accordance with 
Resolution 1244. 
The benchmarks are: 
1. existence of effective, representative and 
functioning institutions; 
2. enforcement of the rule of law; 
3. freedom of movement; 
4. respect for the right of all Kosovans to remain and 
return; 
5. development of a sound basis for a market 
economy; 
6. clarity of property title; 
7. normalised dialogue with Belgrade; and 
8. reduction and transformation of the Kosovo 
Protection Corps in line with its mandate. 
You should have in front of you an illustration of our 
thinking on benchmarks. These benchmarks articulate 
our expectations of Kosovo's leaders and the wider 
public. They mirror the Principles and Priorities in the 
Coalition Agreement signed on 28 February by 
political parties forming the Government. Through 
stimulating public debate, we can also gain broad 
support for needed reforms. 
Attaining these benchmarks is an objective in itself. 
Kosovo can only advance towards a fair and just 
society when these minimum preconditions are met. 
And when the changes in institutions are sustainable 
even without an international presence. 
I offer this to you as an "exit strategy" which is, in 
reality, an "entry strategy" into the European 
integration process. The benchmarks complement the 
preconditions that Kosovo needs to meet to qualify for 
the Stabilisation and Association process. 
I rely on the support of the Security Council for this 
strategy. But in addition to political support, I will still 
need your sustained technical and financial support. 
This is essential in achieving our priorities. Yes, we 
will have to reduce our engagement. But not in the 
moment when we should be capitalising on our past 
work. I am concerned about the anticipated premature 
reduction in the Kosovo peacekeeping budget. After 
the marathon that we have run in Kosovo since '99, it 
would be tragic to falter as we are nearing the finish 
line. 
The next stages of authority transfer will succeed only 
with your help. And only with your backing will 
Kosovo be able to develop normalised dialogue and 
meaningful relations with Belgrade and its neighbours. 
The more we invest now, the more stable, sustainable 
and fair a society we will leave behind. Can we afford 
not to afford returns? Remember: a stable Kosovo is a 
key to a stable region. The more support you give us 
now, the faster we will be able to reduce spending and 
international personnel. 
You have visited Kosovo twice. You have seen it 
develop. Where there was rubble there are now roads 
and schools and hospitals. Where there was anarchy, 
there are now democratically mandated institutions. 
This has been accomplished through our international 
presence and the funds that we have committed. I 
would like to invite you to come again and see what 
you have achieved. 
Mr. President, we have to finish the job we started 
together. It still takes time. But this is now the decisive 
phase. 
Thank you. 
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SRSG Benchmarks 
GENERAL PREREQUISITES: Full compliance with and implementation of Res. 1244 and the Constitutional Framework. Multi-
ethnicity, tolerance, security and fairness under normal conditions, without special measures  
 Goals Benchmarks Action by Local Entities 
Functioning 
Democratic 
Institutions 
Democratic governance; Revenue 
collection and efficient delivery of 
public services; Minority political 
participation and access; Public 
services and public employment 
consolidated; Full implementation of 
undertakings in gov’t coalition 
agreement (28 Feb); PISG authority 
throughout Kosovo  
Effective, representative and 
functioning institutions of gov’t 
authority in all Kosovo; Promotion 
of civil society structures, human 
rights and full participation by 
women; Lead role by PISG in policy 
setting; Transparency in the 
allocation of resources; Meaningful 
participation by minority civil 
servants in gov’t; Responsible and 
professional media 
Accountability through focus on 
delivery of public services; 
Proportionate minority 
representation in gov’t; PISG to 
work in both official languages; 
Align and develop legislation to EU 
and international standards; 
Participation by women in gov’t;  
Rule of Law 
(Police / 
Judiciary) 
Organized crime networks disrupted, 
financial crime checked, and end of 
extremist violence; Public respect for 
police and judic iary:; Impartiality of 
judges and KPS, prosecution of all 
suspected criminals, and fair trial 
guaranteed to everyone; Sufficient 
minority representation  
Extremism not tolerated by 
mainstream; International judges and 
police enabled to take supportive 
function; Increased reliability of and 
prosecution of crime by Kosovo 
judiciary; Customs services and KPS 
partic ipate in anti-organised crime 
strategy; KPS recognised as reliable 
partner int’lly 
Sustained effort by PISG to promote 
values of rule of law; Holders of 
public office to abstain from 
extremist public statements; PISG 
budget support to promote higher 
education and entrance examinations 
in legal field  
Freedom of 
Movement 
All communities can circulate freely 
throughout; Kosovo, including city 
centres, and use their language 
Unrestricted movement by minorities 
without reliance on military or police  
Policy and sustained action by PISG 
to promote FoM publicly; 
Unprompted condemnation by 
holders of public office of 
obstruction and violence 
Returns and 
Reintegration 
All Kosovo inhabitants have their 
right to remain, right to property and 
right to return respected throughout 
Kosovo  
Conditions for safe and sustainable 
returns and reintegration created; All 
IDPs and refugees to have necessary 
information for decisions on returns; 
Returns to urban areas to have 
started; Adequate allocation of 
budget resources by PISG for returns 
and reintegration  
Active advocacy by political and 
community leaders for returns and 
reintegration, hosting of go-and-see 
visits; Key Kosovo-Albanian leaders 
to have participated in go-and-
inform visits where IDPs live; 
Budget allocation by PISG for 
returns and reintegration 
Economy Sound institutional and legal basis 
for a market economy; Balanced 
budget; Privatisation of socially 
owned assets 
Minimum legal and regulatory 
framework to secure investment; 
Improved tax and revenue collection; 
Progress on privatisation 
Support to establishment of solid 
economic framework; Active public 
support for privatisation by holders 
of public office 
Property 
Rights 
All property, including residential 
property, land, enterprises and other 
socially owned assets, will have a 
clear and rightful owner  
Significant progress in repossession 
of properties  
Compliance and support of the 
Housing and Property Directorate 
adjudications; PISG and municipal 
support for evictions; Kosovo budget 
contribution to HPD 
Dialogue 
with 
Belgrade 
Normal relations with Belgrade, and 
eventually with other neighbouring 
areas 
Practical issues addressed through 
direct contacts; Problems solved 
through dialogue and 
correspondence; Business relations 
restarted;  
PISG participation in High-Ranking 
Working Group; Reciprocity in 
PISG visiting Belgrade and 
welcoming visitors to Pristina  
Kosovo 
Protection 
Corps 
Contingent reduced to numbers 
commensurate with its mandate; 
Minority participation  
Appropriately reduced contingent; 
Unqualified compliance with KPC 
mandate; Relations established with 
all communities and proportionate 
minority participation 
Active endorsement by public office 
holders of reduced KPC numbers 
and participation of minorities  
 
